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I. INTRODUCTION 
How should a court divide up fault between two negligent 
parties?  Since its early roots in English common law,1 this 
seemingly simple question has continuously confused juries, 
judges, and lawyers alike.  The question remains at the heart of 
three prominent legal doctrines: (1) reconciliation of inconsistent 
special verdicts, (2) primary assumption of risk, and (3) the 
application of emergency rule instructions.  All three of these 
doctrines were at issue in the Minnesota Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Daly v. McFarland.2  As this note will discuss, all three 
doctrines serve only to confuse the question of how courts divide 
fault between negligent parties.  If we are ever to provide a 
consistent answer to this question, the application of all three 
doctrines in Minnesota must undergo a serious adjustment, if not 
an altogether abandonment. 
This note begins with a historical look at Minnesota cases that 
lay the foundation for the court’s decision in Daly.  Then, given this 
context, the note examines whether the Daly decision flows 
logically from the previous case law.  Lastly, it concludes that 
although the court generally got the decision right, it missed an 
opportunity to bring clarity to an issue that desperately needs it. 
 
 
 
 1. Butterfield v. Forrester, (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B.), 11 East 60. 
 2. 812 N.W.2d 113 (Minn. 2012). 
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II. HISTORY 
Determining whether the Daly decision was right or wrong 
depends largely on the historical context of each of the three issues 
at play.  Therefore, before any analysis of Daly can be made, a 
historical background must be built for each of the three issues 
involved.  Parts A, B, and C of this section examine the origins of 
contributory negligence.  Parts D and E discuss the origins of 
comparative fault.  Part F discusses assumption of risk and Part G 
discusses the emergency rule. 
A. Establishing a Prima Facie Negligence Claim 
Before an examination of its history, it is important to 
understand what a claim of negligence actually entails.  Intentional 
torts involve the intentional harming of a person and thus prohibit 
specific acts like intentional touching and intentional 
confinement.3  Negligence, on the other hand, cannot be neatly 
categorized by a number of specifically forbidden acts.  Instead, 
negligence entails an actionable harm created by a party’s 
unreasonably risky conduct.4  Such a determination cannot be 
made by simply listing out all conduct deemed unreasonably risky.  
Instead, courts have developed a general formula for a negligence 
claim that requires the injured party to establish the following four 
factors: 
1. The tortfeasor owed the injured party a legal duty. 
2. The tortfeasor breached that duty by behaving negligently. 
3. The injured party suffered actual damage. 
4. The tortfeasor’s negligence was an actual and proximate cause 
of the damage.5 
The injured party has the burden of proof in establishing all four 
of these elements, and if the injured party fails to meet any one of 
them, he will not be able to recover.6 
 
 3. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 106 (6th ed. 2009).    
 4. Id.  Notably, this definition makes no mention of an intent element, 
which is so central to the intentional harms like assault, trespass, false 
imprisonment, etc.  
 5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965); DOBBS ET AL., supra 
note 3, at 108. 
 6. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 108. 
3
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B. A Brief History of Negligence as an Independent Tort Action 
The general formula for establishing a prima facie negligence 
claim was not developed in a single landmark decision.  Instead, it 
is the product of a slow development through common law, 
culminating in the ratification of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 281.  Negligence-based claims originated in England as the 
public began to recognize the benefit of holding certain agents like 
carriers, innkeepers, and surgeons to a higher public standard.7  
The arrival of the Industrial Revolution would further spur a 
recognition of negligence as a separate and independent basis for 
tort liability.8  Ultimately, the central question surrounding 
negligence claims has always involved determining what behavior 
counts as causing an unreasonable risk of harm. 
C.  Contributory Negligence as an Affirmative Defense 
As stated previously, the injured party bears the burden of 
proof in establishing the four elements that make up a prima facie 
case for negligence.9  If an injured party successfully establishes all 
four elements, the claim will survive the summary judgment stage 
and reach the jury.10  However, establishing a prima facie case does 
not mean the injured party is entitled to recovery.  As often is the 
case, the injured party may see his recovery reduced or even 
dismissed if the tortfeasor can mount a successful affirmative 
defense.11  Notably, the burden of proof shifts from the injured 
party to the tortfeasor at this stage.  Whereas it previously lay upon 
the injured party to establish the four factors of negligence, the 
tortfeasor now bears the burden of proof in establishing the 
existence of an affirmative defense.12  Although a number of 
affirmative defenses exist,13 the most common is contributory 
negligence—in which the tortfeasor asserts that the injured party 
 
 7. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 28, at 161 (5th 
ed. 1984).  
 8. Percy H. Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 LAW Q. 
REV. 184, 195 (1926).  
 9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281.  
 10. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 251.  
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Local statutes will often create specific defenses relating to particular 
types of cases.  In addition, legislatures may establish “partial” affirmative defenses, 
such as damage caps.  Id.   
4
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himself behaved negligently and thus should see a reduction in 
recovery.14  Importantly, the tortfeasor is not claiming that the 
injured party failed to establish one of the four elements of a 
negligence claim.  Instead, contributory negligence asserts that the 
injured party should be denied recovery because his own conduct 
disentitles him from maintaining the action.15 
D. A Brief History of Comparative Fault 
1. The Early Days 
In its earliest stages, contributory negligence was viewed as a 
complete, all-or-nothing defense to an injured party’s claim.16  
Thus, any finding of contributory negligence at all, no matter how 
small, would completely bar an injured party from recovery.17  Such 
was the case even when a tortfeasor’s negligence was extreme and 
the injured party’s negligence was relatively minor.18  The earliest 
forms of contributory negligence were an all-or-nothing game, 
where a single drop would poison an injured party’s claim, barring 
him from any recovery whatsoever. 
A number of justifications have been put forth for this early 
conception of contributory negligence.  Generally, tort law has 
employed two goals associated with its construction: (1) the 
compensation of injured parties, and (2) deterring unsafe 
conduct.19  The early all-or-nothing view of contributory negligence 
clearly serves the latter of these twin goals.  Instead of focusing on 
the compensation of injuries, early courts seemed more concerned 
with punishing a plaintiff’s own negligent behavior in an effort to 
 
 14. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 65, at 451 (defining contributory 
negligence as “[c]onduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal cause 
to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required 
to conform for his own protection”).  A contributory negligence analysis involves 
essentially the exact same four-element analysis, but instead relating to the injured 
party’s duty, breach, actual and proximate cause, and damages.  See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 cmt. b.  
 15. As Prosser elegantly puts it, “In the eyes of the law both parties are at 
fault; and the defense is one of the plaintiff’s disability, rather than the 
defendant’s innocence.”  KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 65, at 452.  
 16. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 253; see, e.g., Butterfield v. Forrester, (1809) 
103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B.), 11 East 60. 
 17. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 253. 
 18. So long as the defendant’s negligence did not rise to the level of a 
reckless or wanton act.  Id. 
 19. See generally id. at 2–20.  
5
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deter future conduct.20  With this motivation in mind, courts 
conceived that injured parties should come to the courtroom with 
“clean hands,” and failure to do so would result in a complete 
denial of recovery.21 
Another justification for the all-or-nothing view of contributory 
negligence derived from the economic climate of the time.  The 
industrial sector was undergoing a boom in growth, and the courts 
made a conscious effort to stay out of its way as much as possible.22  
Coupled with an inherent distrust of plaintiff-minded juries,23 
courts recognized that industrial growth would be severely 
hindered if liabilities got out of control.24  The all-or-nothing view 
served as the courts’ way of preventing precedent from being 
introduced that might slow industrial growth.  Once again, the 
emphasis on deterrence rather than compensation was apparent. 
Thinking of contributory negligence as an all-or-nothing 
defense is an antiquated viewpoint in light of modern tort law.  In 
addition to the justifications discussed, the courts’ views on 
contributory negligence were largely due to an inability to come up 
with a system for apportioning fault.25  Unlike today, early courts 
thought that a single, indivisible injury must fall solely on the 
plaintiff or the defendant.26  Unfortunately, this would often lead to 
disproportionately harsh results for injured parties, even when 
their own negligence was relatively small and the tortfeasor’s was 
quite extreme.27  If negligence is thought of as a deviation from a 
 
 20. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 65, at 453 (“With the gradual change in 
social viewpoint, such that the compensation of injured persons appears to have 
become the dominant goal of accident law, the defense of contributory negligence 
has come to be looked upon with increasing disfavor by the courts . . . .”). 
 21. Id. at 452.  
 22. See James Fleming Jr., Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 695 n.20 
(1953); see also Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. 
REV. 151 (1947).  
 23. Malone, supra note 22, at 158.  
 24. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 65, at 452 (explaining the reasoning behind 
the all-or-nothing approach: “[c]hief among these was . . . a desire to keep the 
liabilities of growing industry within some bounds”).  
 25. Id. at 470.  
 26. Heil v. Glanding, 42 Pa. 493, 499 (1862) (“The reason why, in cases of 
mutual concurring negligence, neither party can maintain an action against the 
other, is . . . that the law cannot measure how much the damage suffered is 
attributable to the plaintiff’s own fault.”).   
 27. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 67, at 468–69 (“The hardship of the 
doctrine of contributory negligence upon the plaintiff is readily apparent.  It 
places upon one party the entire burden of a loss for which two are, by hypothesis, 
responsible.”).   
6
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communal standard of behavior, it makes little sense why a 
tortfeasor’s negligence, which was just as much a cause of the injury 
as plaintiff’s, was given so much more leeway.28  As shown in the 
following section, this is no longer the case. 
2. Contemporary Comparative Fault Systems 
The deficiencies of the early all-or-nothing conception of 
contributory negligence necessitated a different way of looking at 
fault apportionment.  Instead of focusing on deterring a potential 
plaintiff’s negligence,29 courts began to focus on remedying an 
injury in the most just way possible, marking a shift in the twin 
goals of tort law.  Whereas the focus was previously on deterrence, 
contemporary courts now employ fault-apportionment systems that 
emphasize compensation. 
Instead of playing an all-or-nothing game focused on liability, 
the courts shifted their attention to dividing damages between the 
parties at fault.30  Although courts were initially reluctant to begin 
dividing up fault,31 this type of damage apportionment already 
existed in many civil law32 and common law jurisdictions outside of 
the United States.33  Furthermore, fault apportionment was a 
common concept in English admiralty law with the adoption of the 
Brussels Maritime Convention34 and its provision holding that 
damages would be divided “in proportion to the degree in which 
each vessel was at fault.”35  Eventually, comparative fault would 
 
 28. Id. at 469.   
 29. See id. (“[I]t is quite unlikely that forethought of any legal liability will in 
fact be in the mind of either party.  No one supposes that an automobile driver, as 
he approaches an intersection, is in fact meditating upon the golden mean of the 
reasonable person of ordinary prudence, and the possibility of tort damages, 
whether for himself or for another.” (footnote omitted)); see also Alvis v. Ribar, 421 
N.E.2d 886, 893–94 (Ill. 1981). 
 30. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 67, at 470. 
 31. Id. (discussing the common reasons for the courts’ reluctance, including 
judicial inertia, tradition, and a distrust of the unreliability of a jury in 
determining the division of damages).  
 32. HENRY WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT, § 1:9, at 17 
(1978) (including Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Germany, France, 
Philippines, China, Japan, Russia, Poland, and Turkey). 
 33. England has had a “pure” comparative fault system since 1945.  KEETON 
ET AL., supra note 7, § 67, at 470 n.16.   
 34. See id. at 471 n.17 (citing Maritime Conventions Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, 
c. 57, § 1).  
 35. Id. at 471.  Ultimately, American courts would adopt a similar “pure” 
comparative fault system in maritime law in the 1975.  See United States v. Reliable 
7
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expand into American jurisprudence in the early to mid-twentieth 
century.36 
a. Pure Comparative Fault Systems 
As comparative fault was first getting on its feet, the simplest 
and most flexible method of dividing damages was the “pure” 
comparative fault system.  In a pure comparative fault jurisdiction, 
damages are reduced in strict proportion with the injured party’s 
fault.37  However much the plaintiff was deemed responsible for the 
accident would be the exact amount by which his recovery would 
be reduced.  Thus, once a jury determines the percentage of fault 
for each party, apportioning the damages becomes relatively simple 
under a pure comparative fault system. 
Unfortunately, the pure comparative fault system possesses a 
major flaw.  Because it bases recovery on pure proportionality, it 
can sometimes permit a severely negligent party to recover against 
a slightly negligent party,38 solely because the former suffered more 
severe injuries.39  In an effort to avoid this scenario, many 
jurisdictions have adopted a modified version of the pure 
comparative system. 
b. Modified Comparative Fault 
The most common means of apportioning fault,40 the 
“modified” comparative fault system is essentially a combination of 
the all-or-nothing approach and the “pure” comparative fault 
system.  As was done in a pure comparative fault system, both 
plaintiff and defendant are assigned a percentage of fault.41  
However, if a plaintiff is apportioned over 51% of the fault of the 
accident, then he will not recover (echoing the complete bar to 
 
Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975).  
 36. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 67, at 471 (pointing out that the first 
state to adopt a comparative fault act was Mississippi in 1910). 
 37. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 254. 
 38. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 21.3, at 344–45 
(1974).  
 39. Such is the case where both parties have suffered injuries due to the 
other’s negligence.  See Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 883 (W. 
Va. 1979) (illustrating how a less-at-fault party may be forced to pay the more-at-
fault party under the “pure comparative negligence rule”). 
 40. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, § 3.5, at 73–82.  
 41. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 254. 
8
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recovery seen in the all-or-nothing system).42  If the plaintiff is 
apportioned less than 51%, then his damages are simply reduced 
proportionally to his fault, just as was done in the pure comparative 
fault system.43  In 1969, Minnesota became a modified comparative 
fault jurisdiction with the ratification of Minnesota Statute section 
604.01.44 
E. Distinguishing Between Fault and Cause Apportionment                  
in Minnesota 
The previous sections showed the long evolution of 
contemporary comparative fault, from the early all-or-nothing 
method to Minnesota’s adoption of “modified” comparative fault.45  
Having determined how Minnesota arrived at its current system, it 
is important to discuss how that system actually works.  In either 
contemporary comparative fault system, be it pure or modified, the 
most important step is the jury’s actual apportionment of fault—
that is, the step in which they deem the injured party to be one 
percentage at fault and the tortfeasor another.  Unfortunately, this 
all-important step is often clouded in confusion, frequently 
resulting in inconsistent jury verdicts. 
 
 42. In a number of states, the threshold percentage is 50% instead of 51%.  
See, e.g., Moyer Car Rental, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 610 P.2d 232 (Okla. 1980).  
This is known as the “equal fault bar” approach because it will completely bar a 
plaintiff’s recovery if his fault is equal to (or greater than) the defendant’s.  See id.  
The distinction is important.  Juries will often resort to a 50-50 apportionment of 
fault when the case is simply too close to call.  If within an “equal fault bar” 
jurisdiction, a 50-50 division means that the plaintiff is unable to recover.  See id.  
However, if the threshold is upped to 51%, the plaintiff will not be completely 
barred by a 50-50 apportionment.  See id.  The following states still use the 50% 
threshold: Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, North Dakota, 
Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 67, at 473 n.39. 
 43. Just as the pure comparative fault system possessed a major drawback, so 
too does the modified system.  The flaw occurs when a plaintiff is comparing his 
negligence to that of multiple defendants.  To determine if he is able to recover at 
all, the plaintiff compares his fault to each individual (remember, he is completely 
barred from recovery if his fault is greater than that of the defendant).  Therefore, 
defendants are encouraged to join as many parties as possible in order to lower 
the percentage of fault for each individual defendant.  Some states have tried to 
remedy this problem by implementing a “unit rule” which aggregates the 
negligence of all the defendants.  See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 67, at 473–74; 
see also id. § 67, at 474 n.46 (providing examples of the “unit rule” jurisdictions).  
However, Daly does not involve multiple defendants, requiring no further 
elaboration.   
 44. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (2012).   
 45. See supra Part II.A–D. 
9
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The confusion seen in the apportionment step often comes 
from not being fully clear on the distinction between cause and 
fault.  Although it may be subtle, the distinction becomes apparent 
by understanding one key notion: a party will never be legally 
responsible for an act, no matter how severely negligent, if the act 
causes no actual harm.46  In other words, a party will not be liable if 
there is no direct cause.47  For example, a person driving 70 miles 
per hour through a residential neighborhood, but does not hit 
anything, will not be liable for negligence because he was not a 
direct cause of any harm.  Causation is binary; it either exists or it 
does not.48  If it does, and the jury determines that a party was a 
direct cause, the jury can then apportion that party the percentage 
of fault of the accident.  Therefore, it is inconsistent for a jury to 
rule a party to not be a direct cause of an accident, and then 
apportion that same party a percentage of fault for the accident.  
Unfortunately, this distinction is a difficult concept to grasp and 
can often lead to inconsistent jury verdicts, much like the one seen 
in Daly. 
With the 1951 enactment of Rule 49.01 of the Minnesota Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Minnesota introduced special verdict forms to 
jury trials.49  In negligence cases, special verdict forms are often the 
primary way of getting the jury to assign percentages of fault to 
each party.50  Although it is logically inconsistent to do so,51 it is an 
unfortunate reality that juries will sometimes apportion fault to a 
party who they have already determined not to have been a direct 
cause of the accident.  Evolving from a series of cases responding to 
this very scenario, Minnesota courts have developed a two-step 
protocol for dealing with inconsistent special verdicts: (1) if 
possible, the court should reconcile the inconsistent answers;52 (2) 
 
 46. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 107. 
 47. This is the actual and proximate cause element discussed previously.  See 
supra Part II.A.   
 48. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 67, at 474. 
 49. MINN. R. CIV. P. 49.01.  
 50. Typically this involves a series of interrogatives that initially pertain to 
direct cause, followed by a series of interrogatives apportioning percentages of 
fault based on the answers to the initial direct cause questions.  See Daly v. 
McFarland, 812 N.W.2d 113, 124 n.5 (Minn. 2012).  
 51. See, e.g., infra note 55. 
 52. Reese v. Henke, 277 Minn. 151, 155, 152 N.W.2d 63, 66 (1967) (“[T]he 
verdict is to be liberally construed to give effect to the intention of the jury and to 
harmonize answers to interrogatories if it is possible to do so.  The test is whether 
the answers can be reconciled in any reasonable manner consistent with the 
10
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if reconciliation is not possible, then the court should either have 
the jury deliberate further53 or issue a new trial.54 
When faced with an inconsistent special verdict form, 
Minnesota courts will first look to reconcile the inconsistent 
answers if it is at all possible to do so.  Such was the case in Reese v. 
Henke,55 in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held that, as a 
matter of law, it was its duty to reconcile the verdict.56  In doing so, 
the court held that the special jury verdict should be liberally 
construed in order to maintain the true intent of the jury.57  
Furthermore, the Reese court held that reconciling special verdict 
answers must be done such that a reasonable person could only 
interpret the inconsistent answers in one way.58  The important 
takeaway from Reese is that courts will first try to reconcile 
inconsistent answers in order to maintain the jury’s intent. 
If the inconsistent answers can simply not be reconciled, then 
the court will likely either send the jury back for further 
deliberation or order a new trial.59  The option to resubmit the case 
to the jury was established by the 1975 ruling in Peterson v. Haule.60  
There, the jury returned a special verdict finding that both 
defendants were negligent, but neither was a direct cause of the 
accident.61  Despite this determination, the verdict later 
 
evidence and its fair inferences.”). 
 53. Peterson v. Haule, 304 Minn. 160, 174–75, 230 N.W.2d 51, 60 (1975) 
(“[T]he trial judge could either have ordered a new trial or sent the jury back for 
further deliberations.”).  
 54. Meinke v. Lewandowski, 306 Minn. 406, 412, 237 N.W.2d 387, 391 (1975) 
(recognizing that ordering a new trial is a legitimate course of action when faced 
with inconsistent answers to special verdict interrogatories). 
 55. 277 Minn. 151, 152, 152 N.W.2d 63, 64--65 (1967).  Plaintiff in Reese was a 
passenger in a car that was involved in an accident with a truck.  Id.  Plaintiff sued 
the drivers of both vehicles for negligence.  Id.  The jury returned a special verdict 
form indicating that both defendants were negligent, but the driver of the car did 
not directly cause the accident.  Id. at 155, 152 N.W.2d at 66.  The truck driver 
argued that this verdict was inconsistent.  
 56. Id. at 156, 152 N.W.2d at 67.   
 57. Id. at 155, 152 N.W.2d at 66. 
 58. Id.  Ultimately, the Reese court reconciled the special verdict form by 
holding that a reasonable person could only interpret the answers to mean that 
both defendants were direct causes of the accident and therefore liable to the 
plaintiff.  Id. at 156, 152 N.W.2d at 67.  
 59. See Carufel v. Steven, 293 N.W.2d 47 (Minn. 1980); Peterson v. Haule, 304 
Minn. 160, 230 N.W.2d 51 (1975). 
 60. 304 Minn. 160, 230 N.W.2d 51 (1975).  Plaintiff, a ten-year-old girl, was 
injured when she walked into a restaurant’s glass door, causing the glass pane to 
fall on top of her.  Id. at 161, 230 N.W.2d at 53. 
 61. Id. at 163–65, 230 N.W.2d at 54. 
11
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apportioned liability to both defendants.62  The jury admitted that 
they had trouble understanding some of the questions,63 prompting 
the trial judge to revise and resubmit the questions for further 
deliberation.64  As a result, the jury subsequently returned a 
consistent special verdict form, finding that the defendants were in 
fact direct causes of the plaintiff’s injuries.65  Upon appeal, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed that the trial court’s response 
to the inconsistent answers was both legitimate and the ideal course 
of action given the circumstances.66 
The third option is to simply order a new trial.  In Meinke v. 
Lewandowkski,67 the Minnesota Supreme Court exercised this option 
after the trial judge had improperly reconciled an inconsistent 
special verdict.68  While the Meinke court affirmed that ordering a 
new trial was a legitimate option, it stressed that it was the least 
preferable of the three.69  In fact, the only reason the court elected 
to order a new trial was because the trial court, having been 
presented with the inconsistent answers, improperly directed the 
jury to change specific responses in order to make the special 
verdict consistent.70  However, having passed the trial court stage,71 
 
 62. Id. at 164–65, 230 N.W.2d at 54. 
 63. Id. at 165, 230 N.W.2d at 55.   
 64. Id. at 166, 230 N.W.2d at 55. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 175, 230 N.W.2d at 60 (“[T]he trial judge could either have ordered 
a new trial or sent the jury back for further deliberations . . . .  [T]he course 
selected by the trial court was the appropriate one under the circumstances of this 
case also.  It was clearly shown by its answers to the special interrogatories and its 
questions to the court that the jury was considerably confused as to direct cause.  
To enter judgment for defendants in such a case would be to ignore the realities 
of the situation.  The trial judge should consider the surrounding circumstances in 
disregarding the inconsistent answers of the jury and in sending them back for 
further deliberations.”). 
 67. 306 Minn. 406, 237 N.W.2d 387 (1975).  Meinke again involved a plaintiff 
who was a passenger in a vehicle, which was involved in a car accident.  Plaintiff 
sued both drivers.  The jury returned a special verdict indicating that only one 
defendant was a direct cause of the accident but later apportioned liability to both.  
Id. at 407--08, 237 N.W.2d at 389. 
 68. Id. at 414, 237 N.W.2d at 393. 
 69. Id. at 412, 237 N.W.2d at 391 (“[I]t has been recognized that the trial 
judge, when confronted with this problem, may (1) render judgment against the 
party having the burden of proof; (2) order a new trial; or (3) send the jury back 
for further deliberations.  We believe the interests of justice and economy are 
ordinarily best served by the third alternative.” (citation omitted)). 
 70. Id. at 414, 237 N.W.2d at 392.  This was an obvious abuse of discretion, a 
problem that would not have existed if the trial court had instead simply reiterated 
the notions of direct cause and fault and sent the jury back for further 
12
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ordering a new trial is sometimes the only recourse available to an 
appellate court. 
Until this point, this note has focused on the origins of 
contributory negligence and comparative fault.  The discussion will 
now shift to the second issue in Daly: primary assumption of risk. 
F. A Brief History of Assumption of Risk 
Just as contributory negligence is an affirmative defense, so too 
is assumption of risk.72  Just like contributory negligence, an 
assumption of risk defense only comes into play after the injured 
party has established a prima facie negligence claim.73  Since 
contributory negligence and assumption of risk were both 
originally viewed as complete bars to recovery, the tortfeasor would 
traditionally raise either one or the other, or both.74  As both would 
completely prevent the plaintiff from being awarded any damages, 
it really made no practical difference what the defense was called.75  
Unfortunately, this often led to a misunderstanding regarding the 
distinction between the two and commonly caused the two defenses 
to be confused with one another.76 
The key distinction between an assumption of risk defense and 
contributory negligence is consent.  Essentially, assumption of risk 
means that the injured party gave his consent to relieve the 
tortfeasor of any duty of reasonable care and essentially took his 
chances in encountering a known danger.77  This consent can be 
express or implied, but it must be given by a plaintiff who (1) had 
knowledge of the risk, (2) appreciated the danger of the risk, and 
 
deliberation.  As the Minnesota Supreme Court stated, “the trial judge must take 
care not to interfere with the jury’s role as the sole determiner of the issues 
presented to it.”  Id. at 412, 237 N.W.2d at 392.  
 71. And thus any chance to simply resubmit the questions to the jury for 
further deliberation. 
 72. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 284. 
 73. As will be discussed infra Part II.F.2, this is a traditional view of 
assumption of risk and is not how it is currently done in Minnesota courts. 
 74. See Bugh v. Webb, 328 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Ark. 1959). 
 75. See Michael K. Steenson, The Role of Primary Assumption of Risk in Civil 
Litigation in Minnesota, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 115, 124 (2003) (“The term 
‘primary assumption of risk’ had not yet been utilized for analytical purposes, in 
part because there was no clear need to distinguish between those categories of 
assumption of risk due to the fact that both were complete bars.”). 
 76. See generally Petrone v. Margolis, 89 A.2d 476 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1952).  This is especially a problem today considering contemporary views of 
comparative fault no longer bar a plaintiff’s claim for contributory negligence. 
 77. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 68, at 481. 
13
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(3) voluntarily accepted the risk.78  However, this does not mean 
that any plaintiff who voluntarily encounters a known risk is 
necessarily consenting to the tortfeasor’s negligence.79  Prosser and 
Keeton’s jaywalker perfectly elucidates this point: 
A pedestrian who walks across the street in the middle of a 
block, through a stream of traffic travelling at excessive 
speed, cannot by any stretch of the imagination be found 
to consent that the drivers shall not use care to watch for 
him and avoid running him down.  On the contrary, he is 
insisting that they shall.  This is contributory negligence 
pure and simple; it is not assumption of risk.80 
In Prosser and Keeton’s scenario, although the jaywalker will likely 
be found contributorily negligent and thus see his damages 
reduced, he will not be completely barred from recovery by an 
assumption of risk defense. 
Early assumption of risk cases were born out of the master-
servant relationship.81  Notably, the employer-employee 
relationship is based in subjective contract law, rather than the 
reasonable-conduct standard, an objective concept, which 
underlies tort principle.82  In the employment context, assumption 
of risk was used to bar recovery for employees who were injured 
while performing a dangerous job.83  It was thought that employees 
assumed the risks of an employer’s negligence in exchange for 
wages and benefits—again, reiterating the contract-based 
conception of the parties’ relationship.84  Unfortunately, this line of 
reasoning would often lead to disproportionately harsh results for a 
number of employees.85 
 
 78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C (1965). 
 79. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 68, at 485. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Priestley v. Fowler, (1837) 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Exch.). 
 82. See Ann D. Bray, Comment, Does Old Wine Get Better with Age or Turn to 
Vinegar?  Assumption of Risk in a Comparative Fault Era—Andren v. White Rodgers, 
18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1992). 
 83. See Steenson, supra note 75, at 117–24 (discussing the origins of primary 
assumption of risk in Minnesota as it relates to the duties an employer owes an 
employee). 
 84. Bray, supra note 82, at 1144; see also Steenson, supra note 75, at 125 (“The 
operation of assumption of risk in the master-servant context was rationalized on 
the basis that the servant contracted for the master’s immunity in return for the 
payment of wages.”). 
 85. Bray, supra note 82, at 1144 n.26 (citing Anderson v. H.C. Akelely Lumber 
Co., 47 Minn. 128, 49 N.W. 664 (1891).  In Anderson, Plaintiff was injured when the 
belt on a planing machine broke.  47 Minn. 128, 49 N.W. 664.  Plaintiff had 
14
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Interestingly enough, English common law, from which 
assumption of risk is derived, was quick to acknowledge the 
economic pressure of workers under threat of losing their jobs.86  
Accordingly, English courts were wary of the assertion that an 
employee voluntarily accepts the risks simply by being employed.87  
American courts were much slower in arriving at this notion, and a 
number of courts upheld assumption of risk defenses even when 
the plaintiff was injured under a direct command of an employer 
threatening to terminate employment if the injured party had 
acted otherwise.88  Fortunately, this line of reasoning was largely 
abandoned with the passage of workers’ compensation acts.89 
1. The Effect of Comparative Fault Reformation on Assumption      
of Risk 
As stated previously, assumption of risk and contributory 
negligence were at one time thought of as one in the same.90  This 
would drastically change with the widespread adoption of 
comparative fault statutes that took place in the mid to late 
twentieth century.91  Minnesota adopted its own system of modified 
comparative fault with the 1969 passage of Minnesota Statute 
section 604.01,92 which, like many other jurisdictions, barred 
significant consequences to Minnesota’s conception of assumption 
of risk.  Contributory negligence was no longer a complete bar, and 
 
reported the worn belt to his foreman, who told plaintiff to continue working.  Id.  
The court acknowledged that the employer was negligent in failing to replace or 
repair a worn belt.  Id. at 130, 49 N.W. at 604.  However, the court held that 
plaintiff had assumed the risk because it “does not appear that any necessity rested 
upon him to proceed with the use of the machine,” and plaintiff could have 
repaired the belt himself, “although it was not within the general scope of his duty 
to repair belts in the mill.”  Id. at 130, 49 N.W. at 665. 
 86. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 68, at 491 n.16 (listing cases that 
recognize the economic pressure of workers under threat of loss of employment).  
 87. Id. at 491. 
 88. See, e.g., Dougherty v. W. Superior Iron & Steel Co., 60 N.W. 274 (Wis. 
1894).   
 89. See Bray, supra note 82, at 1149–50 (stating that assumption of risk was 
eventually removed from the master-servant relationship with the enactment of 
workers’ compensation laws but remained popular in other tort actions like 
negligence claims).  
 90. See supra note 72--76 and accompanying text. 
 91. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (Westlaw, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. 
Sess.); see also Christopher Curran, The Spread of the Comparative Negligence Rule in 
the United States, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 317, 319–21 (1992). 
 92. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (2010). 
15
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courts were suddenly faced with a need to clarify how assumption 
of risk and comparative fault differed.  A number of jurisdictions 
held that assumption of risk should either be abandoned 
altogether or merged with their respective comparative fault 
systems.93  Other jurisdictions, including Minnesota, have chosen to 
distinguish between various forms of assumption of risk and 
employed a number of different terms to describe the distinction, 
such as “express” versus “implied,” or “reasonable” versus 
“unreasonable.”94  Minnesota has chosen to distinguish between 
“primary” assumption of risk and “secondary” assumption of risk.95  
Secondary assumption of risk is essentially another way of referring 
to the contributory negligence defense and will not be further 
discussed here.96 
2. Minnesota’s Confusing Conception of Primary Assumption        
of Risk 
As subtle as it may seem, primary assumption of risk is actually a 
much different concept than the traditional assumption of risk 
defense.  The key difference is that primary assumption of risk is 
not an affirmative defense at all.97  Instead, primary assumption of 
risk relates to the issue of whether the plaintiff was actually owed a 
duty in the first place.98  Thus, it is not an affirmative defense, but 
rather a means of negating a plaintiff’s prima facie claim.99  The 
basic elements of primary assumption of risk remain the same: (1) 
knowledge of the risk, (2) appreciation of the danger, and (3) 
 
 93. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So.2d 287, 293 (Fla. 1977); Abernathy v. 
Eline Oil Field Servs., Inc., 650 P.2d 772, 775 (Mont. 1982); Rutter v. Ne. Beaver 
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 437 A.2d 1198, 1209 n.5 (Pa. 1983) (showing nineteen states that 
have abolished the assumption of risk doctrine, including: Alaska, California, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, 
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).   
 94. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 68, at 496–98.  
 95. See generally Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 
(1971).  
 96. Id. at 23, 192 N.W.2d at 826  (“Implied assumption of risk, in its secondary 
sense as an affirmative defense in tort actions, will hereafter, including the instant 
case, be limited to those situations in which the voluntary encountering of a 
known and appreciated risk is unreasonable.  It is to be considered a phase of 
contributory negligence, to be submitted with and apportioned under our 
comparative negligence statute . . . .”). 
 97. Id. at 24, 192 N.W.2d at 827. 
 98. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 68, at 496–97. 
 99. Id. 
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voluntarily acceptance of the risk.100  If successful, primary 
assumption of risk will relieve the tortfeasor of any duty to the 
injured party, thereby completely barring any recovery.101 
In Minnesota, the seminal case discussing primary assumption 
of risk is Springrose v. Willimore.102  Taking place just two years after 
the enactment of section 604.01, the Springrose court sought to 
clarify the role of assumption of risk given Minnesota’s recent 
adoption of modified comparative fault.103  In doing so, the court 
established the “primary” and “secondary” assumption of risk 
distinction: 
Assumption of risk has been conceptually distinguished 
according to its primary or secondary character.  Primary 
assumption of risk, express or implied, relates to the 
initial issue of whether a defendant was negligent at            
all—that is, whether the defendant had any duty to 
protect the plaintiff from a risk of harm.  It is not, 
therefore, an affirmative defense.104 
Furthermore, the Springrose opinion limited the types of scenarios 
in which the implied primary assumption of risk should apply,105 
citing “landowner-licensee” and “inherently dangerous sporting 
event” cases as illustrative.106 
The cases immediately following Springrose reiterated the 
relationship between primary assumption of risk and the duty 
 
 100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496(C) (1965). 
 101. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 289–91. 
 102. 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).  Springrose involved a plaintiff who 
was injured in an accident after riding in a car with knowledge that the driver was 
inexperienced and was drag-racing other cars. Id. at 26–27, 192 N.W.2d at 828–29. 
 103. Id. at 24–25, 192 N.W.2d at 827 (“The practical and most important 
impact of this decision is to mandate that, like any other form of contributory 
negligence, assumption of risk must be apportioned under our comparative 
negligence statute . . . .”). 
 104. Id. at 24, 192 N.W.2d at 827. 
 105. Id.; Steenson, supra note 75, at 131 (“The most important point of the 
court’s discussion of primary assumption of risk is that it has limited reach . . . .”). 
 106. Springrose, 292 Minn. at 24, 192 N.W.2d at 827; see also Daly v. McFarland, 
812 N.W.2d 113, 116 (Minn. 2012) (citing Grisim v. TapeMark Charity Pro-Am 
Golf Tournament, 415 N.W.2d 874, 876 (Minn. 1987)) (relieving amateur golfers 
of duty of care towards spectators); Rieger v. Zackoski, 321 N.W.2d 16, 23–24 
(Minn. 1982) (relieving duty of care towards patrons at the track during a 
sanctioned auto race); Moe v. Steenberg, 275 Minn. 448, 450, 147 N.W.2d 587, 589 
(1966) (relieving defendant of duty of care in ice skating collisions); Modec v. City 
of Eveleth, 224 Minn. 556, 563, 29 N.W.2d 453, 457 (1947) (barring claims by 
spectators at a hockey game). 
17
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question.107  Initially, Minnesota courts completely couched the 
primary assumption of risk analysis within the duty question.108  
Primary assumption of risk was viewed as one of many elements in 
determining whether the injured party was owed a duty.109  
Therefore, if a duty did exist, primary assumption of risk, by 
definition, would be inapplicable.110  This methodology will be 
referred to as a non-sequential analysis. 
Such was the case until a recent pair of Minnesota Supreme 
Court rulings started to examine primary assumption of risk 
completely independent from the duty question.111  Instead of 
viewing primary assumption of risk as a contributing factor in 
determining the duty question, the court removed primary 
 
 107. An illustrative case is Bakhos v. Driver, which involved a plaintiff who fell 
from a tree while attempting to remove a branch with a power saw.  275 N.W.2d 
594 (Minn. 1979).  At trial, the jury ruled the defendant was 60% negligent when 
he pulled on a rope attached to the limb the plaintiff was sawing.  Id. at 595.  The 
jury then held that the plaintiff assumed the risk and entered judgment for the 
defendant.  Id.  The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, and held that, as a 
matter of law, the evidence showed that the plaintiff had not assumed the risk and 
remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor the plaintiff according 
to the 60%/40% apportionment.  Id.  Defendant’s negligence was ruled to be 
both the cause of the accident and could not have been foreseen by the plaintiff.  
Id.  Therefore, even though the plaintiff did ultimately choose to ascend the tree, 
“he did not voluntarily choose to expose himself to the risk of the negligent 
actions of the defendant which caused the fall.”  Id.  Because this duty still existed 
as at the time of the fall, it cannot be said that the plaintiff had assumed the risk.  
Id.  The Bakhos opinion serves as a clear indication that, at the time, the court 
viewed primary assumption of risk to be linked to the duty issue in an almost 
symbiotic manner—because the plaintiff lacked the three elements of assumption 
of risk, the defendant’s general duty of reasonable care still existed, thereby 
making primary assumption of risk inapplicable.  Id. 
 108. Steenson, supra note 75, at 138 (“[P]rimary assumption of risk in the cases 
it might reach are in effect cases involving the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff.”). 
 109. Id. at 142–43 (referencing Springrose, “prior supreme court decisions 
appear to view primary assumption of risk as an integral part of the duty 
determination”). 
 110. Two years after the decision in Bakhos, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
once again visited the link between primary assumption of risk and duty in Iepson 
v. Noren.  308 N.W.2d 812 (1981).  There, the court held that primary assumption 
of risk did not bar plaintiff’s recovery from injuries sustained when his motorbike 
collided with a pickup truck.  Id. at 815--16.  The court followed reasoning from 
both Springrose and Prosser to conclude that plaintiff never consented to relieve 
the defendants of their duty to act reasonably, thereby making primary assumption 
of risk inapplicable.  Id. at 815–16; see also Steenson, supra note 75, at 138 (“The 
important point is that primary assumption of risk is inapplicable where the 
defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff.”). 
 111. See Baber v. Dill, 531 N.W.2d 493 (Minn. 1995); see also Louis v. Louis, 636 
N.W.2d 314 (Minn. 2001). 
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assumption of risk from the duty question altogether.112  Under the 
new methodology, the existence of a duty must first be established 
before any discussion of primary assumption of risk can take 
place.113  The court’s reasoning was as follows: (1) primary 
assumption of risk serves to relieve114 a defendant of his or her duty 
to the plaintiff; (2) if the defendant owes no duty in the first place 
then there is nothing of which to relieve; and (3) therefore, any 
subsequent discussion of primary assumption of risk is pointless.115  
This conception of primary assumption of risk will be referred to as 
the sequential method. 
Until this point, this note has focused on the origins of 
contributory negligence, comparative fault, and primary 
assumption of risk.  The discussion will now shift to the final issue 
in Daly: emergency rule instruction. 
G. Emergency Rule Instruction 
Minnesota courts have dealt with the emergency doctrine as 
far back as 1879.116  The pivotal case, however, is the 1935 decision 
in Johnson v. Townsend, in which the court laid out the modern 
expression of the emergency doctrine: 
[O]ne suddenly confronted by a peril, through no fault of 
his own, who, in the attempt to escape, does not choose 
the best or safest way, should not be held negligent 
because of such choice, unless it was so hazardous that the 
ordinarily prudent person would not have made it under 
similar conditions.117 
The Johnson definition of the emergency rule was reaffirmed in 
Byrns v. St. Louis County,118 as well as in a number of additional 
cases.119 
 
 112. Baber, 531 N.W.2d at 495.  
 113. Id. (“Before a court considers assumption of risk, it should first determine 
whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff.  If no duty exists there is no 
need to determine whether a person assumed the risk thus relieving the defendant 
of the duty.”). 
 114. “Relieving” is meant in the sense that no duty exists.  Steenson, supra note 
75, at 138 (“It is important to note that in these cases when the court speaks in 
terms of ‘relieving’ a defendant of liability, it is concluding that the defendant 
owes no duty to the plaintiff under certain circumstances.”).  
 115. Baber, 531 N.W.2d at 495. 
 116. See Wilson v. N. Pac. R.R. Co., 26 Minn. 278, 3 N.W. 333 (1879). 
 117. 195 Minn. 107, 110, 261 N.W. 859, 861 (1935). 
 118. 295 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. 1980). 
 119. 4 MICHAEL K. STEENSON & PETER B. KNAPP, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JURY 
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Whereas Johnson laid out the general rule of the emergency 
doctrine, a number of cases focus on its individual elements.120  In 
Gran v. Dasovic, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted emergency 
rule instructions precisely because the defendant driver’s 
encounter with an ice patch was deemed “sudden.”121  In Gran, the 
slope of the road and its deceptively dry condition were key to 
ruling that the ice patch effectively came out of nowhere.122  The 
district court in Daly would use similar reasoning to find that a 
“sudden peril” in a snowmobiling case would be something akin to 
a deer jumping into the road.123 
In addition to the “suddenness” element, the emergency 
doctrine requires that the peril must not be caused by the party 
requesting the instructions.124  This element was discussed in 
Thielbar v. Juenke, in which a school bus in the middle of an 
intersection was ruled to not constitute “sudden peril.”125  Such was 
the case because the bus was in plain sight; the tortfeasor had 
entered the intersection at excessive speed and made no attempt to 
avoid a collision.126  Recognizing that it would be unfair to allow the 
defendant to be advantaged by its application, the court held that 
the emergency rule “cannot be . . . invoked by a party who has 
brought the emergency upon himself or who has failed in the 
application of due care to avoid it.”127 
 
 
INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CIVIL § 25.16 (5th ed. 2012) (listing a number of cases 
reaffirming the Johnson court’s description of the emergency rule). 
 120. Although there are a number of different elements to the emergency 
doctrine, only those pertinent to the Daly decision will be examined. 
 121. 275 Minn. 415, 419–20, 147 N.W.2d 576, 579–80 (1966). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Daly v. McFarland, 812 N.W.2d 113, 124 (Minn. 2012) (discussing how in 
declining to give emergency rule instructions, the district court likened an 
emergency in this situation to a deer jumping in the middle of the road). 
 124. STEENSON & KNAPP, supra note 119 (“This rule cannot be invoked by one 
who, through his own fault, created the emergency.” (citing Mathews v. Mills, 288 
Minn. 16, 24, 178 N.W.2d 841, 846 (1970); Kachman v. Blosberg, 251 Minn. 224, 
235, 87 N.W.2d 687, 695–96 (1958))). 
 125. 291 Minn. 129, 133–34, 189 N.W.2d 493, 496–97 (1971); see also Kachman 
v. Blosberg, 251 Minn. 224, 235, 87 N.W.2d 687, 695 (1958) (establishing that 
before emergency instructions can be given, there must be a finding that the peril 
in question was not brought about by the party requesting the instruction). 
 126. Theilbar, 291 Minn. at 134, 189 N.W.2d at 497. 
 127. Id. (quoting Kachman, 251 Minn. at 235, 87 N.W.2d at 696). 
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III. THE DALY DECISION 
In January 2007, Christopher Daly, Zachary McFarland, Neil 
Forsberg, and Jeff Engelkes were riding their snowmobiles four 
abreast as they crossed a bean field near Engelkes’s engine repair 
shop.128  Approaching a ditch at the end of the field, Daly slowed 
down and McFarland began to pass him.129  In doing so, 
McFarland’s snowmobile hit a snow drift and vaulted into the air.130  
Trying to avoid injury, McFarland pushed the snowmobile away 
from his body and into Daly’s path.131  Unable to avoid it, Daly 
collided with McFarland’s airborne snowmobile and suffered 
injuries when he was thrown from his own snowmobile.132 
Daly sued McFarland for injuries sustained as a result of the 
accident, claiming that McFarland was negligent in not adjusting 
his speed to deal with drifts.133  Responding to five questions listed 
on a special verdict form, a unanimous jury found that both Daly 
and McFarland were negligent,134 but Daly’s negligence was not a 
direct cause of the accident.135  However, the jury then proceeded 
to allocate 30% of the fault of the accident to Daly.136  Despite this 
inconsistency, the district court entered judgment for Daly in the 
amount of $442,633.50, the full amount of damages.137 McFarland 
moved for a new trial based on three alleged errors: (1) failure to 
instruct the jury on the primary assumption of risk doctrine, (2) 
failure to instruct the jury on the emergency rule, and (3) an 
improper reconciliation of the jury’s special verdict form answers.138  
 
 128. Daly, 812 N.W.2d at 117. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  Daly testified that McFarland’s snowmobile “just shot straight up in 
the air.”  Id. at 118. 
 131. Id. at 117. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See MINN. STAT. § 84.87, subdiv. 2(1) (2010) (making it illegal to operate a 
snowmobile at a rate of speed greater than reasonable or proper given the 
circumstances). 
 134. Daly admitted that at the time of the crash, he was wearing headphones 
and listening to music.  Daly, 812 N.W.2d at 118. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Daly v. McFarland, No. 53-CV-08-117, 2010 WL 1751801 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 
Mar. 23, 2010), aff’d in part No. A10-1184, 2011 WL 206193 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 
25, 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 812 N.W.2d 113 (Minn. 2012). 
 138. Daly, 812 N.W.2d at 119.  It should be noted that the author has decided 
to focus this case note solely on the court’s application of the primary assumption 
of risk doctrine and the emergency rule instructions, as these are the issues most 
pertinent to tort law.  Whether the district court abused its discretion in 
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The district court denied the motion in its entirety and the court of 
appeals affirmed.139 
After granting certiorari, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.140  The court 
affirmed the decision to deny both the primary assumption of 
risk141 and the emergency rule instructions.142  However, it was also 
found that the district court abused its discretion in reconciling the 
inconsistent answers to the special verdict form.143  For the court, it 
was irreconcilable that Daly be both not causally negligent and 
apportioned 30% of the fault for the accident.144  The court 
reasoned that the jury believed McFarland to be either 70% or 
100% at fault, and therefore remanded to the district court with 
instructions to enter a remittitur allowing Daly to choose between 
$309,843.45 in damages or a new trial.145 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The previous sections of this note were designed to build the 
appropriate historical background of the three issues involved in 
Daly.  Having done so, this note now turns to whether the court’s 
decision in Daly was appropriate in light of that historical context.  
As will be shown, although the court ultimately got the Daly 
decision right, it missed a key chance to rid Minnesota of some 
confusing legal doctrines. 
 
reconciling the answers to the special verdict form is a question best saved for the 
civil procedure realm. 
 139. Daly, 2011 WL 206193. 
 140. Daly, 812 N.W.2d at 127. 
 141. Id. at 119–22. 
 142. Id. at 122–24. 
 143. Id. at 124–27. 
 144. Id. at 126 (“[T]he jury answered one question by concluding that Daly 
was not causally negligent, and then concluded in the very next question . . . that Daly 
was causally negligent for 30% of the accident.  These answers are directly 
contradictory and not subject to reconciliation.”). 
 145. Id. at 127.  It is necessary to note the dissent of Justice Anderson, who 
disagrees with the majority’s assessment that the special verdict answers are 
irreconcilable.  Given the broad discretion trial courts typically have in reconciling 
answers, Justice Anderson believes the district court’s interpretation is plausible, 
thereby freeing the district court of any abuse of discretion charge.  Id. at 127–30 
(Anderson, J., dissenting).   
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A. The Response to the Inconsistent Special Verdict Answers                                   
Was Appropriate 
The court’s issuance of a remittitur was generally appropriate 
given the circumstances.  Although it is not considered one of the 
three responses courts typically utilize,146 the issuance of a 
remittitur has been established as a viable course of action in 
Minnesota.147  Ultimately, the remittitur was a creative solution to 
the trial court’s abuse of discretion. 
Ideally, the trial court should have elected to clarify the 
distinction between fault and cause apportionment and resubmit 
the special verdict to the jury for further deliberation.  Although it 
is true that answers to special verdict forms should be liberally 
construed, the purpose of doing so is to maintain the true intent of 
the jury.148  Minnesota case law has shown over and over again that 
juries are often confused on the distinction between cause and 
fault apportionment.149  When faced with inconsistent answers, the 
best way of maintaining the jury’s intent is to first clarify the 
confusion and then allow further deliberation.  Whether it is 
conceivable that Question 5 in the special verdict form was simply 
superfluous should not matter.  What matters is that the responses 
accurately reflect the intention of the jury, which can be easily 
attained by clarifying the confusion and resubmitting the special 
verdict form.150 
Obviously, the Minnesota Supreme Court is not in a position 
to simply resubmit questions to a jury.  However, the remittitur 
offers a nice compromise between the remaining options of 
reconciling the answers or ordering a new trial.  Although the 
answers to the special verdict form were directly inconsistent, it is 
clear that the jury believed McFarland was either 70% or 100% 
 
 146. Again, the three options are: reconciliation, resubmission, or the 
ordering of a new trial.  See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.  
 147. See Prodgroski v. Kerwin, 147 Minn. 103, 179 N.W. 679 (1920). 
 148. Reese v. Henke, 277 Minn. 151, 155, 152 N.W.2d 63, 66 (1967) (“[I]t is 
necessary to keep in mind that the verdict is to be liberally construed to give effect 
to the intention of the jury and to harmonize answers to interrogatories if it is 
possible to do so.”). 
 149. See generally supra Part II.E.  
 150. The dissent argues that the district court is in the best position to know 
the jury’s true intent when answering the special verdict form.  Daly, 812 N.W.2d at 
129 (Anderson, J., dissenting).  This argument seems to overlook the option of 
simply asking the jury to clarify what its intent was, instead of attempting to 
reconcile inconsistent answers in an effort to reflect what the district court 
thought the jury’s intent was.   
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responsible for the accident.151  Issuing a remittitur gives Daly, the 
beneficiary of the trial court’s decision, the choice of accepting 
lesser damages and avoiding the costs of a new trial.  Or, if Daly so 
chooses, he can follow the traditional course of action and 
implement a new trial.  Although its issuance is not a traditional 
option for dealing with inconsistent jury verdicts, a remittitur is a 
well-established remedy in other areas of Minnesota case law.152  
This seems a creative and fair compromise given the 
circumstances.153 
Going forward, trial courts should be especially aware of the 
confusing nature of fault apportionment.  When faced with 
inconsistent answers to interrogatories, trial judges should be 
hesitant to reconcile the answers without attempting to clarify and 
resubmit to the jury.  Trial judges can also be proactive by ensuring 
that the questions on special verdict forms are framed such that the 
apportionment questions are only answered if direct cause has first 
been established.154  By clearing up confusion at the trial level, trial 
judges can preserve judicial economy155 and ensure that special 
verdict forms reflect the true intention of the jury. 
B. Primary Assumption of Risk 
1. The Denial of Primary Assumption of Risk in Daly                 
Was Appropriate 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision to not apply primary 
assumption of risk doctrine to Daly fits logically in the continuum 
 
 151. Id. at 127 (majority opinion).  
 152. See, e.g., Runia v. Marguth Agency, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 45 (Minn. 1989) 
(upholding the validity of remittiturs in Minnesota); Podgroski, 147 Minn. at 104, 
179 N.W. at 680 (“[T]his court may grant a new trial for excessive or inadequate 
damages and make it conditional upon the party against whom the motion is 
directed consenting to a reduction or an increase of the verdict.”).  
 153. Furthermore, it would seem particularly unfair to force Daly to undergo a 
new trial even if he would rather take reduced damages and avoid further legal 
fees and time commitment.  In actuality, Daly did elect to accept the reduced 
damages.  
 154. See Meinke v. Lewandowski, 306 Minn. 406, 410, 237 N.W.2d 387, 390 
(1975) (“Either as a preface to the comparative negligence question in the special 
verdict or in the court’s instructions . . . the jury should be told the previous 
answers or findings which make necessary an answer to the comparative 
negligence question.” (quoting Orwick v. Belshan, 304 Minn. 338, 345, 231 
N.W.2d 90, 95 (1975))).  
 155. Especially considering that an abuse of discretion will inevitably lead to an 
order for a new trial.  
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss1/12
  
2012] DIVISION OF FAULT 299 
of Minnesota case law.156  As previously stated, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has applied two different approaches to primary 
assumption of risk.157  Initially, the court conceived of primary 
assumption of risk as a factor in the duty question.  Recently, 
however, the court has employed a sequential analysis: analyzing 
duty independently before primary assumption of risk is even 
allowed to enter the discussion. 
Under either methodology, primary assumption of risk is 
inapplicable to Daly.  According to Minnesota Statute section 84.87, 
subdivision 2, McFarland owes Daly a duty of due care to operate 
his snowmobile in a reasonable manner given the conditions and 
the speed at which they are traveling.158  The existence of this duty 
immediately rules out primary assumption of risk under a non-
sequential analysis.159  Under the more recent sequential analysis, 
the existence of this duty would allow a discussion of primary 
assumption of risk to take place.  However, it clearly cannot be said 
that Daly, simply by participating in the ride, (1) had knowledge of 
the risk, (2) appreciated its danger, and (3) voluntarily accepted 
the risks.  McFarland himself testified that in his twenty years of 
snowmobiling, he has never had a snowdrift react the way this one 
did.160  This statement indicates that neither party was aware of this 
type of snowdrift, nor did they appreciate the risks it posed.  
Clearly, it cannot be said that by simply participating, Daly was 
consenting to the risk of McFarland negligently running into the 
snowdrift, having it throw his vehicle in the air, and come crashing 
down into Daly’s path. 
2. A Flawed System 
As the previous analysis has shown, primary assumption of risk 
in Minnesota is confusing, convoluted, and in need of reform.  The 
very fact that two methodologies exist shows how unclear primary 
assumption of risk can be.161  Before a discussion of its three factors  
 
 156. See Carpenter v. Mattison, 300 Minn. 273, 219 N.W.2d 625 (1974); Olson 
v. Hansen, 299 Minn. 39, 216 N.W.2d 124 (1974). 
 157. See supra Part II.F.2.  
 158. MINN. STAT. § 84.87, subdiv. 2 (2012). 
 159. Steenson, supra note 75, at 138 (“The important point is that primary 
assumption of risk is inapplicable where the defendant owes a duty to the 
plaintiff.”). 
 160. Daly v. McFarland, 812 N.W.2d 113, 118 (Minn. 2012). 
 161. See Baber v. Dill, 531 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn. 1995).  Notably, the 
statement, “If no duty exists, then no primary assumption of risk exists,” is logically 
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even takes place, it is unclear where or how primary assumption of 
risk relates to the duty issue. 
The biggest problem with Minnesota’s conception of primary 
assumption of risk is that it appears to be in direct contradiction 
with the motivation behind the move toward comparative fault.  As 
stated previously, the move away from all-or-nothing contributory 
negligence signaled a change in emphasis in tort goals: shifting 
from deterring negligent action to focusing on compensating 
injury.  Minnesota’s primary assumption of risk system echoes of 
the deterrent-based systems of the past.162  The problem lies in the 
multiple opportunities the tortfeasor has to cut down the injured 
party’s recovery.  Ultimately, a tortfeasor will have three chances to 
reduce his liability.  First, he can argue that no duty existed.  If that 
fails, he can go on to argue that the injured party primarily 
assumed the risk.  But if a primary assumption of risk analysis is 
supposed to take place independently from the duty issue, as it is 
supposed to under Minnesota’s adoption of the sequential 
analysis,163 where is the assumption of risk analysis supposed to 
happen?  Does it once again come in as an affirmative defense?  
But what about Springrose’s comments that primary assumption of 
risk is explicitly not an affirmative defense?164 
But even at the tortfeasor’s failure to show primary assumption 
of risk, he is still afforded one more whack at the injured party’s 
claim—he can always fall back on comparative fault in order to 
reduce his damages.  The injured party’s claim is forced to survive a 
 
equivalent (via contrapositive) to the statement: “If primary assumption of risk does 
exist, then a duty does exist.”  Ultimately, this equivocation may not be particularly 
useful given the point of a sequential analysis is to look first at duty before moving 
to primary assumption of risk discussion.  However, it does show the stark 
difference between a sequential analysis (where we said “if primary assumption of 
risk exists, then a duty does exist”) and a non-sequential analysis (where we said “if 
primary assumption of risk exists, then a duty does not exist”).  Although the Baber 
court deemed it “elementary” that the sequential analysis is the correct 
methodology, this comparison shows how drastic a change the Baber opinion truly 
was. 
 162. This is especially the case with the strict sequential system. 
 163. See generally Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314 (Minn. 2001); Baber, 531 
N.W.2d 493. 
 164. Springrose v. Willimore, 292 Minn. 23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971) 
(“Primary assumption of risk, express or implied, relates to the initial issue of 
whether a defendant was negligent at all—that is, whether the defendant had any 
duty to protect the plaintiff from a risk of harm.  It is not, therefore, an affirmative 
defense.”). 
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three-part attack in order to be entitled to any recovery.165  This is 
unreasonable.  The move from the all-or-nothing contributory 
negligence system to the comparative fault system was motivated by 
a conscious shift from an approach based on deterrence to an 
approach based on compensation.166  But Minnesota’s current 
system so heavily favors the tortfeasor that it harkens back to a 
deterrence-based approach to dividing up fault—an approach that 
was heavily flawed for placing too much of the burden on a single 
party for a loss that was caused by two.167  In order to more 
accurately reflect the compensatory motivation behind 
contemporary fault apportionment, the sequential approach to 
primary assumption of risk must be abandoned.  Instead, 
Minnesota courts should either clearly limit primary assumption of 
risk to the non-sequential approach seen in Springrose or join other 
jurisdictions in abandoning primary assumption of risk in favor of 
sole reliance on the comparative fault doctrine.168 
3. Snowmobiling Does Not Qualify Under Springrose’s 
Purposefully Narrow Application of Primary Assumption of Risk 
In an important point of the Springrose opinion,169 the court 
sought to strictly limit the types of scenarios to which primary 
assumption of risk would apply.170  Specifically, the court makes 
mention of “licensees upon another’s property” and “patrons of 
 
 165. Steenson, supra note 75, at 147 (“The defendant would have two 
opportunities to persuade the court and the jury that the plaintiff should not be 
entitled to recover, and then still rely on the fallback position that the plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent, assuming adverse findings on the duty and breach and 
primary assumption of risk issues.”).  
 166. See supra Part II.D.2.  
 167. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 67, at 468–69. 
 168. See, e.g., McGrath v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 A.2d 238, 240–41 (N.J. 1963); 
see also Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So.2d 1123, 1130 (La. 1988) (citing 
HENRY WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT, §§ 6.1–6.8. (2d ed. 1987) (“[S]ixteen states 
have totally abolished the defense, and seventeen more have eliminated the use of 
assumption of risk terminology in all cases except those involving express or 
contractual consent by the plaintiff . . . .  [A]ssumption of the risk now appears to 
be passing from the scene in most common law jurisdictions.”)). 
 169. See Steenson, supra note 75, at 130, 159 (arguing that the “most important 
point of the court’s discussion of primary assumption of risk [in Springrose] is that 
it has limited reach” and that “[t]he Eighth Circuit is right in its observation that 
the supreme court has narrowed the application of the [primary assumption of 
risk] doctrine”). 
 170. Springrose v. Willimore, 292 Minn. 23, 25–26, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827–28 
(1971). 
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inherently dangerous sporting events” as illustrative scenarios to 
which primary assumption of risk might apply.171  Despite this 
limited application, McFarland contends that riding a snowmobile 
qualifies as an “abnormally dangerous sporting activity.”172  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court has twice rejected this classification.173  
The court’s explicit unwillingness to go along with McFarland’s 
classification, combined with the emphasis placed on stare 
decisis,174 made McFarland’s task too formidable to overcome.175 
4. A Dangerous Precedent 
The previous sections have discussed how the court’s denial of 
primary assumption of risk was appropriate given Minnesota case 
law.  The analysis was backward-looking and sought guidance 
through a historical examination.  The Daly decision, however, is 
also appropriate when applying a forward-looking analysis.  Had 
the court ruled that snowmobiling did constitute an “abnormally 
dangerous sporting activity,” the door would be open for primary 
assumption of risk to creep into areas not intended by the narrowly 
focused Springrose opinion.  If primary assumption of risk can be 
raised in a snowmobiling case, how long until it is seen in a 
motorcycle case?  Automobiles?176  Suddenly, in any case involving a 
car crash, the defendant driver will simply assert that the plaintiff, 
by choosing to get behind the wheel, assumed the risk of getting 
into an accident.  Now, no driver will be liable because primary 
assumption of risk absolves the defendant of any duty and thereby  
 
 
 
 171. Id. at 24–25, 192 N.W.2d at 827. 
 172. Daly v. McFarland, 812 N.W.2d 113, 121 (Minn. 2012). 
 173. See Carpenter v. Mattison, 300 Minn. 273, 273, 219 N.W.2d 625, 625 
(1974); Olson v. Hansen, 299 Minn. 39, 44, 216 N.W.2d 125, 128 (1974). 
 174. See State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Minn. 2009) (noting that due to 
the principle of stare decisis, the court will “require a ‘compelling reason’ before a 
decision will be overruled”). 
 175. Furthermore, because evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to Daly, 
the court would accept Daly’s claim that snowmobiles are equally or more safe 
today than they were when Olson and Carpenter were decided.  Therefore, the 
court’s car analogy still holds true.  See Daly, 812 N.W.2d at 121. 
 176. Some may be quick to point out that tortfeasors in this scenario would 
owe a statutory duty to the injured party, much in the same way McFarland did in 
Daly.  Even if this is the case, under a sequential analysis, in which duty is 
examined independent of primary assumption of risk, the injured party’s claim 
may still be barred.  
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss1/12
  
2012] DIVISION OF FAULT 303 
acts as a complete bar to plaintiff’s claim.  Ruling that 
snowmobiling constitutes an inherently dangerous sporting activity 
would be a dangerous precedent to set. 
C. The Emergency Rule Should Not Be Applied to Daly and Should Be 
Abandoned in Minnesota 
In following the definition of the emergency rule, as laid out 
in Johnson,177 the court correctly denied McFarland’s request for 
emergency rule instructions.  However, as the Daly case exhibits, 
emergency rule instructions are more cumbersome than 
beneficial.178  Although the decision to deny an emergency rule 
instruction was correct, the court simply did not go far enough. 
Given the Johnson definition of the emergency rule, the court 
correctly denied its instruction because of a lack of two elements: 
(1) the peril encountered was not sudden, and (2) the peril 
encountered was created by McFarland’s own doing.179  This is not 
a case of a deer jumping into the middle of the road.180  First, as the 
court notes, great credence is placed on the suddenness element of 
the emergency rule.181  It is unclear how encountering a snowdrift 
could constitute a sudden emergency.  McFarland himself testified 
that snowdrifts are a common occurrence when snowmobiling.182  
Although it may not have been visible,183 encountering a 
commonplace snowdrift is not akin to a sudden emergency 
requiring the type of instinctive reaction typically seen in 
emergency rule cases.184  Additionally, as opposed to the “deer 
jumping in the road” example, any peril presented to McFarland 
was the result of his own driving, thereby precluding him from 
 
 177. Johnson v. Townsend, 195 Minn. 107, 110, 261 N.W. 859, 861 (1935). 
 178. See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Modern Status of Sudden Emergency 
Doctrine, 10 A.L.R. 5th § 3[a]–[b], at 680 (1993) (presenting many jurisdictions 
that have abandoned the doctrine because of its habit of confusing the jury). 
 179. Johnson, 195 Minn. at 110, 261 N.W. at 861. 
 180. The district court stated that an emergency in the Daly situation would 
have to be something akin to a deer jumping out in the middle of the road.  Daly, 
812 N.W.2d. at 123. 
 181. Id. (“The essential requirement underlying the emergency rule is 
confrontation of a sudden peril requiring an instinctive reaction.”). 
 182. Id. at 123–24 (referencing McFarland’s testimony that snowdrifts can be 
described as a normal hazard of snowmobiling). 
 183. McFarland testified that he never saw the drift as hazardous before he hit 
it.  Id. at 118.  It remains unclear if this means he did not see it at all. 
 184. For instance, consider the district court’s example of a deer jumping onto 
the road. 
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requesting emergency rule instructions.185  Because (1) the peril 
resulted from McFarland’s own actions, and (2) there was no 
“suddenness” to the supposed emergency, the court correctly 
declined emergency rule instructions. 
Although the court was accurate in its denial, it is 
disappointing that it did not put an end to the emergency rule 
altogether.  At best, the emergency rule is designed to recognize 
that an emergency situation may cause a reasonable person to act 
incorrectly but not negligently.186  However, the granting of 
emergency rule instructions too often confuses the jury into 
thinking that a general duty of due care analysis is inapplicable to 
an emergency situation.187  Furthermore, emergency instructions 
are already encompassed in the general standard of due care.188  
The sudden peril of an emergency should simply be one of the 
circumstances that the jury may consider in determining how a 
reasonable person would have behaved in the same or similar 
circumstances.  Because any potential benefit (and arguably no 
benefit when considered to be already encompassed in the general 
standard of due care) is outweighed by the propensity for 
confusion, the emergency rule doctrine should be dismissed.  
Minnesota should join the number of other states that have 
altogether dismissed the emergency rule as a viable legal theory.189 
V. CONCLUSION 
Generally, the Minnesota Supreme Court got Daly right.  The 
ordering of a remittitur was a creative solution to the abuse of 
 
 185. Daly, 812 N.W.2d. at 124. 
 186. See Scott Andrew Irby, Case Note, Wiles v. Webb: The Abrupt End of the 
Sudden Emergency Doctrine in Arkansas, 51 ARK. L. REV. 833, 843–49 (1998) 
(discussing the emergency rule and its confusion in relation to the general 
standard of care). 
 187. Ghent, supra note 178, § 3[a] (“Even the wording of a well-drawn 
instruction intimates that ordinary rules of negligence do not apply to the 
circumstances constituting the claimed sudden emergency . . . .”); see also Irby, 
supra note 186, at 833 (discussing Wiles v. Webb, 946 S.W.2d 685, 686 (Ark. 1997), 
in which the court ruled that emergency rule instructions were “inherently 
confusing”). 
 188. See Lyons v. Midnight Sun Transp. Servs., Inc., 928 P.2d 1202, 1206 
(Alaska 1996) (“We believe that the sudden emergency instruction is a generally 
useless appendage to the law of negligence.  With or without an emergency, the 
standard of care . . . is still that of a reasonable person under the circumstances.”). 
 189. See Ghent, supra note 178, §§ 3–4 (listing a number of jurisdictions that 
have either completely abandoned the emergency rule or have heavily restricted 
its use). 
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discretion issue and provided the court with another option when 
faced with inconsistent special verdicts in the future.  Primary 
assumption of risk was inapplicable to Daly and rightly remained 
limited in its application, as intended by the Springrose definition.  
The emergency rule was also inapplicable due to a lack of 
suddenness and the fact that the “emergency” was brought on by 
McFarland himself. 
Despite being correct in its decision to apply neither primary 
assumption of risk nor the emergency rule, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court simply did not go far enough.  The Daly case 
provided the court with a unique opportunity to bring clarity to two 
legal doctrines that have only provided confusion.  Unfortunately, 
the court chose to allow both doctrines to linger on. 
 
31
Cary: Torts: Playing the Blame Game: The Division of Fault between Negl
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012
